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ABSTRACT 
The EU is developing new structures for its Security and Defense Policy and tries to 
achieve a more integrated security and defense policy. Currently, the principle of unanimity 
controls the conduct of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. This is one main reason 
why the EU is in some cases unable to speak with one voice.  
In the U.S., the President and Congress are the main players in the area of war powers. 
The President is the most important actor in the area of foreign affairs. However, Congress has 
the power of the purse and the power to declare war. The role of the courts is rather limited. 
A good understanding of the respective legal structures of the EU and the U.S. helps the 
reader to analyze why the U.S. acts in a certain way and why the E.U. may have difficulty to 
develop a response to a crisis. 
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Chapter I 
An Introduction to War Powers in the U.S. and Europe 
A. The EU and the USA: A Comparison of two International Actors  
One of the most important functions of the state is to provide external security for its 
citizens and to guarantee its own independence and sovereignty.1 Most states have therefore 
established armed forces. The United States is currently seen as the sole military superpower in 
the world, whereas the Member States of the European Union are, due to their size, not yet in a 
position to compare themselves with U.S. military might.2 This has led Europeans to the idea of 
establishing a common defense policy in the future.3  
However, an actual European defense policy, or an even more ambitious common 
defense for the continent, likely will not be agreed upon in the immediate future. This thesis is 
consequently not a real comparative analysis, since the United States is a nation state with an 
established constitutional framework for the allocation of the military powers among the 
different branches of government.  
The European Union can hardly be considered a nation state. The European Union is 
something new and its future and destination are uncertain today. Therefore, the discussion of the 
                                                 
1  Cf. Armin von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Supranational Federation: A Conceptual Attempt in the Light 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 27, 33 (2000); Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin, Introduction,  
in  THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT 
PERSPECTIVES, 1 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin, eds., 1994); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 70-77 (1998). 
2  Cf. Mark C. Anderson, A Tougher Roe to Hoe: The European Union’s Ascension as a Global Superpower 
analyzed through the American Federal Experience, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 83-86, (2001). 
3  Cf. Jeff P.H. Cazeau, European Security and Defense Policy: European Union vs. United States: European 
Security and Defense Policy under the Gun, 10 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51 (2002); Asteris Pliakos, 
The Common European Policy on Security and Defense: Some Considerations Relating to Its Constitutional Identity, 
6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 275 (2000). 
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respective legal structures of the European Security and Defense Policy shows not a fixed 
structure, but depicts the process Europeans have developed to cooperate on a closer and closer 
level. However, a thorough assessment of the respective legal structures regarding war powers 
and security and defense policy enables the reader to gain a better understanding of the conduct 
of the United States in international affairs and also explains why the European Union is in some 
situations unable to react.  
 
B. Defining War 
Since the U.S. Constitition mentions the term “war”, it is useful to define this notion. 
When the U.S. Constitution was framed, the term “war” was well understood in public 
international law.4 The most important legal text today with respect to the concept of war is the 
Charter of the United Nations5 which interestingly refrains from using the term “war” but instead 
prohibits the “use or threat of force”.6  
Article 2, sec. 4 of the U.N. Charter provides explicity: “All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”  
Conflicts which are not seen as “real” full scale wars are therefore also encompassed by 
the prohibition of the use of force. So-called measures short of war fall under Article 2, sec. 4 of 
the U.N. Charter, since “force” means in each case every use of military force, be it small or 
large.7 It can be concluded that international law does not distinguish between “real” large scale 
                                                 
4  LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 98 (2nd ed. 1996). 
5  Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
6  HENKIN, supra note 4, at 98; KNUT IPSEN, VOELKERRECHT, 935-36, (4th ed. 1999). 
7  IPSEN, supra note 6, at 936. 
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wars and military actions of a less devastating degree, whereas the U.S. Constitution refers to 
“war” and may be interpreted as distinguishing between military involvements based on the 
extent of the military activities.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8  Cf. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 98-99. 
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Chapter II 
European Defense and Security Policy: A Legal Analysis of Past,  
Present and Future Structures 
After the end of World War II, Western Europe was economically, politically and 
morally exhausted. Winston Churchill in his famous Zurich speech on September 19, 1946, made 
it clear that a unification of Western Europe would be in the best interest of western European 
nations, in order to promote their economic and political status. He therefore proposed the 
foundation of a United States of Europe, with a strongly build cooperation between the two old 
enemies France and Germany at its center.9 In the following decades, western Europeans were 
able to integrate their economies successfully by means of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the Treaties Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).10 In the economic 
field, western Europeans were successful in establishing a concept of supranationality, thereby 
showing a willingness to abandon sovereignty in this area. In contrast with these developments, 
it was and still is extremely difficult for European states to pursue a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.11 Although some progress has been made in the area of foreign policy, it was 
and is still the greatest challenge for Europeans to agree on a common defense policy.12 The 
reluctance of the EU Member States in this area is easily conceivable, since defense policy lies at 
                                                 
9  See P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2-3, (Laurence W. Gormley ed.,3rd ed. 1998); THOMAS OPPERMANN, 
EUROPARECHT, 8-9 (2nd ed. 1999). 
10  See DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 3-8 (3rd ed. 1993). 
11  See ROY H. GINSBERG, THE EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: BAPTISM BY FIRE, 
1-10 (2001); OPPERMANN, supra  note 9, at 10-27. 
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the heart of national sovereignty.13 Despite all the obstacles facing a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and in particular facing a Common Defense Policy, the notion of further 
“European progress” in this important area has  been on the political agenda of Europeans for a 
long time - sometimes more hidden, sometimes more prominent. Ideas of a Common European 
Security Policy may have their historic background and inspiration in ancient and medieval times, 
so that in this context, the Roman Empire and the Franconian Empire, created by Charlesmagne, 
are mentioned; furthermore, some historians also mention the Napoleon conquest as politically 
relevant to the current political process in the EU which aims at developing a real Common 
Security Policy. 14  Since World War II, European states have developed different kinds of 
cooperation with respect to the area of security and defense policy. 
 
A. Defense Cooperation in Response to the German Aggression (1940-1949) 
On June 16, 1940, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill offered the creation of a 
Franco-British union as a response to the German invasion of France. 15  Churchill’s idea 
contained the establishment of common institutions regarding foreign and defense policy, as well 
as economic and finance policy.16 Most interestingly, Churchill also proposed  a single war 
cabinet for the time of the war, which was supposed to lead the respective armies of the two 
countries. 17 France, however, never accepted this proposal; it has to be emphasized that, at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
12  See Donato F. Navarrete & Rosa Maria F. Egea, The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European 
Union: A Historical Perspective, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 41, 42 (2001). 
13  See Elizabeth Shaver Duquette, The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Emerging from the 
U.S. Shadow?, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 169, 170 (2001). 
14  THE ECONOMIST, January 3rd –9th 2004, Special Report European Unity: The History of an Idea, at 20-22. 
15  Navarrete & Egea, supra note 12, at 42. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
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time of Churchill’s proposal, the President of the French Council of Ministers, Paul Reynaud, 
resigned and was succeeded by Philippe Petain, who established the infamous Vichy regime.18 
Two years after the war, on March 4, 1947, France and the United Kingdom concluded 
the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance19 in Dunkirk, which inter alia provided for defense 
cooperation in the case of a German attack.20 In 1948, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed, upon a proposal made by British Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin, the Treaty of Brussels21, which inter alia established a defense agreement, which was not 
only directed against Germany, but also against the  Soviet Union.22 After the accession of West 
Germany and Italy, the Treaty of Brussels was changed from an anti-German pact into a west 
European treaty of collective security, which established the Western European Union (WEU).23 
 
B. NATO24 as the Guarantor of Western Europe’s Security 
1.  Introduction to the NATO Treaty 
On April 4, 1949, NATO was founded in Washington.25 The original goal of NATO was 
quite interestingly described as “keeping the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans 
down“.26 The founding members of NATO were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United 
                                                 
18  See id. at 42-43. 
19  Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Mar. 4, 1947, Fr.-U.K., 9 U.N.T.S. 187. 
20  Cheryl Swack, Building a Bridge for Defense: The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 6 
YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 1, 6 (1997/1998). 
21  Treaty of Brussels, Mar. 17, 1948, Fr.-U.K.-Belg.-Neth.-Lux., 19 U.N.T.S. 51. 
22  Swack, supra note 20, at 6-7. 
23  OPPERMANN, supra note 9, at 900. 
24  North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (hereinafter NATO Treaty). 
25  Swack, supra note 20, at 9-10. 
26  Gernot Erler, Germany’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 1, 3 (1996). 
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States.27 In 1952, Turkey and Greece became NATO members.28 In 1955, the Federal Republic 
of Germany was also admitted to NATO.29 In 1982, Spain, and in 1999, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, became NATO members.30 It is expected that in May 2004, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will become NATO members.31 
NATO was founded in order to encounter the threat posed by the Soviet Union on 
Western Europe and it is still the main contributor to security in Western Europe.32 The NATO 
treaty is a collective defense agreement, which becomes clear when looking at the most crucial 
provision of Article V, which provides that “an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all“.33 In the case of an 
attack, the NATO members have agreed to assist the attacked party.34 Article V of the NATO 
Treaty describes this kind of assistance as an “exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations“. 
The NATO treaty  affirms in its preamble that the alliance recognizes the principles of the 
UN Charter.35 NATO is not considered a regional organization in the sense of Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, but a collective self-defense organization.36 NATO invoked Article V only once in 
its entire history: this was after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center.37 
 
                                                 
27  Michael M. Gallagher, Comment: Declaring Victory and Getting Out of Europe: Why the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Should Disband, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L 341, 345 (2003). 
28  Id. at 346 
29  OPPERMANN, supra note 9, at 900. 
30  NATO Handbook, Chapter 1: What is NATO? The Origins of the Alliance,  at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0101.htm. (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
31  NATO Issues, Nato Enlargement, at http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) 
32  See Swack, supra note 20, at 14; Gallagher, supra note 26, at 344-346; Francis A. Gabor, NATO’s New Paradigm 
for European Security: International Legal Issues in Ethnic Self-Determination, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L 
L.REV. 39, 41 (2002). 
33  Gabor, supra note 32, at 41-42. 
34  NATO Treaty, supra note 24, art. 5. 
35  See Gabor, supra note 32, at 42. 
36  Id. 
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2. European Security and Defense Identity within NATO 
Within NATO, the development of a European Security and Defense Identity becomes 
increasingly important. The Heads of State and Government of the NATO member countries in 
Washington in 1999 discussed, how to provide for means of consultation and cooperation 
between the EU and the NATO institutions, thereby using the already created mechanisms 
between NATO and the WEU; moreover, they addressed possibilities for EU access to NATO 
military capabilities and planning structures.38  
Furthermore, the material improvement of the military capabilities of the European 
member states of NATO is of crucial importance, since Europeans want to be more responsible 
for their own security and depend less on the capabilities of the United States.39 
The further development of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO is of 
equal importance for both NATO and the EU, which tries to establish a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy that encompasses the idea of a possible framing of a common defense policy.40 
In 2000, it was possible for NATO and the EU Council Secretariat to conclude an interim 
security agreement, which provided for rules addressing the mutual use of classified data.41 On 
March 14, 2003, a final NATO-EU Security of Information Agreement was signed in Athens, 
which governs the exchange of classified information. 42  The EU-NATO Declaration on 
European Security and Defense Policy on December 16, 2002, serves as the basic legal 
document for the established cooperation between the two organizations. It provides inter alia for 
                                                                                                                                                             
37  EILEEN DENZA, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PILLARS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION; at 342 (2002). 
38  NATO Handbook, Chapter 4: The European Security and Defense Identity. Evolution of the ESDI, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
39  See id. 
40  See id. 
41  NATO Handbook, Chapter 4: The European Security and Defense Identity: NATO-EU Relations, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0403.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
42  NATO Press Release (2003) 022, 14 Mar. 2003: NATO-EU security of information agreement signed today, at 
http://www. nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-022e.htm. (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
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“effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency“, reaffirms the 
importance of the UN Charter, and most importantly states that NATO is enabling the EU access 
to its planning capabilities.43 
 
C. The European Defense Community 
The then French Defense Minister, Rene Pleven, made the proposal to create a European 
army on October 24, 1950, in the French National Assembly.44 This so-called Pleven Plan was 
seen as the French reaction to the American idea to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into 
NATO.45 The French position was described as an attempt to gain control over the German army, 
which would have been much more difficult solely within the structures of NATO.46  
The European Defense Community Treaty (EDC) was signed on May 27, 1952, by 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.47 
All parties to the treaty except France were able to secure the ratification by their respective 
national parliaments.48 In fact, the French National Assembly decided “to adjourn the debate on 
the acceptance of the EDC Treaty sine die”.49 
Among the reasons for the French refusal to ratify the treaty were: concerns about large 
American influence on the EDC; a reduction of the importance of the French arms industry; a 
reduction of French sovereignty; and problems in connection with France’s continued ambition 
to create an empire and secure its colonial rule in Southeast Asia and Africa. Moreover, without 
                                                 
43  NATO Press Release (2002) 142, 16 Dec. 2002: EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm. (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
44  KAPTEYN &VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 9; Navarrete & Egea, supra note 12, at 45. 
45  KAPTEYN &VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 10. 
46  Navarrete & Egea, supra note 12, at 45. 
47  KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 10. 
48  Navarrete & Egea, supra note 12, at 45; KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 10-12. 
49  KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 12. 
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participation of the United Kingdom, it was seen as quite difficult by the French to control the 
West German army.50 
The EDC treaty created a common defense agreement and provided for the establishment 
of a European army, which would have been commanded by a European defense 
commissioner.51 The most crucial feature of the EDC treaty was the principal abolishment of 
national armies, while establishing a European army that would have included contingents from 
the Member States.52 
After the failure of the EDC, Europeans concentrated in the following years on economic 
integration and left aside the idea of political cooperation in the fields of foreign and security 
policy.53 
 
D. European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
In 1970, the then six Member States54 of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
adopted the Luxembourg Report and created the concept of European Political Cooperation 
(EPC). The European Political Cooperation established a consultation mechanism outside the 
legal structures of the Community for the EEC Member States for questions of foreign policy.55 
The process of European Political Cooperation was of an intergovernmental nature and was 
conducted outside the structures of the European Economic Community.56 In some cases it was 
possible to establish common positions on foreign policy issues and common views at 
                                                 
50  See Navarrete & Egea, supra note 12, at 45-46. 
51  Id. at 45. 
52  See id. at 46. 
53  See Sergio Baches Opi & Ryan Floyd, A Shaky Pillar of Global Stability: The Evolution of the European Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 299, 302 (2003). 
54  In 1970, these were France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, see KAPTEYN & 
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 17-21. 
55  See Duquette, supra note 13, at 171; Navarrete & Egea, supra  note 12, at 49; Opi & Floyd, supra note 53, at 
302-03. 
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international conferences. In certain situations, the Europeans were able to agree upon common 
actions.57 The main goal of the concept of European Political Cooperation was to promote the 
position of the European countries in international politics.58 In 1974, the Member States set up 
the European Council59 , thereby providing for an institutionalized relationship between the 
political, and especially, the foreign policy sphere on the one hand, and the community block on 
the other hand, which was dealing with economic integration.60 
 
E. The Single European Act61 (SEA) 
The Single European Act (SEA), which was agreed upon in 1986 and entered into force 
in 198762, provided a legal basis for the European Political Cooperation in its Title III, which was 
consequently denoted “Treaty Provisions on European Co-Operation in the Sphere of Foreign 
Policy“.63 The SEA therefore established a “formalized link” between the foreign policy area and 
the system of the three communities, which dealt with economic integration in Western 
Europe.64 
Article 2 of the SEA provided that the European Council consists of the Heads of State 
and Government of the Member States and the President of the Commision of the European 
Communities. The goal to make “concrete progress towards European unity“ was set forth in 
Article 1 of the SEA for the European Communities and the European Political Co-operation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
56  Duquette, supra note 13, at 171. 
57  See id. at 171. 
58  Id. 
59  The European Council consists of the Heads of State and Government of the EEC countries and the President of 
th European Commission; they are supported by their respective Foreign Ministers and another Member of the 
Commission, see KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 183. 
60  Opi & Floyd, supra note 53, at 303. 
61  Single European Act, Jun.  29, 1987, O.J. (L 169) 1 (1987) (hereinafter SEA). 
62  Navarrete & Egea, supra note 12, at 50. 
63  SEA, title III. 
64  Opi & Floyd, supra note 48, at 303. 
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Article 30 (1) of the SEA states that the Member States of the European Communities 
agreed upon to „endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy“. The 
Member States with this provision established the possibility of consultations and information 
exchanges regarding foreign policy within the framework of European Political Cooperation.65 
The Contracting Parties agreed to do the utmost to avoid actions which would jeopardize them 
being an effective, united force in international politics.66 
Article 30 of the SEA does not contain explicit provisions on a European defense policy, 
but nevertheless addresses the issue of European security in paragraph (6), which reads as 
follows: 
“(a) The High Contracting Parties consider that closer co-operation on questions of 
European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European 
identity in external policy matters. They are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on 
the political and economic aspects of security. 
(b) The High Contracting Parties are determined to maintain the technological and 
industrial conditions necessary for their security. They shall work to that end both at national 
level and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies. 
(c) Nothing in this Title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security between 
certain of the High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or 
the Atlantic Alliance.” 
This particular provision demonstrates that the states recognized the need for closer 
cooperation in the area of security policy and the possibility of enhanced coordination of 
positions. However, this provision does not establish concrete concepts of integration with 
                                                 
65  SEA art. 30 (2) (a) (b). 
66  SEA art. 30 (2) (d). 
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respect to the conduct of foreign policy in general. From a practical point of view, the obligations 
entered into by the Member States through the SEA were described as quite weak.67 Title III of 
the SEA, which referred to foreign policy issues, was totally characterized by the 
intergovernmental structure, which always required unanimity.68 
In fact, the Member States very seldom recurred to foreign and security policy issues 
under SEA art. 30.69 However, significantly, Europeans now had a legal document which for the 
first time in the history of the integration project made a reference to the possibility of common 
endeavours with respect to security matters.70 
It has to be stressed that the Member States used “a rather firmer voice” with respect to 
their determination to keep the military technology and respective industry for Western Europe’s 
security.71 Article 30 (6) (c) of the SEA brings in a reference to closer cooperation among some 
Member States, thereby reflecting a realistic approach in this crucial area.72 
Although the SEA exluded the area of defense,73 this treaty contained some provisions as 
to security policy in a more general sense. Based on a retrospective view from the year 2004, the 
SEA was the first step towards the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy in 
the EU, which now is on its way to eventually create even a common defense policy. 
 
F. The Treaty of Maastricht74 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU hereinafter) was signed on February 7, 1992 in the 
Dutch city of Maastricht and went into force on November 1, 1993.75 The TEU established a 
                                                 
67  Duquette, supra note 13, at 172. 
68  Id. at 172; Opi & Floyd, supra note 53, at 303. 
69  OPPERMANN, supra note 9, at 904. 
70  DENZA, supra note 37, at 345. 
71  Id. at 345. 
72  Id.  
73  Navarrete & Egea, supra note 12, at 51. 
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three-pillar system consisting of the three European Communities, the intergovernmental area of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the cooperation in the fields of justice and home 
affairs.76 
Title V of the TEU contained almost all important provisions with respect to the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Art. J of the TEU (as in effect 1993) (repealed by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam) stated that “(a) common foreign and security policy is hereby established“, 
thereby distinguishing the Maastricht approach from the SEA, which only provided that the 
establishment of a common foreign policy was a goal for the Member States.77  
The provisions of title V are procedural in nature, because the substance of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy has to be created by referring to the procedural framework of the 
TEU in this area. 78  However, the new provisons definitively can be seen as an important 
improvement compared to the SEA.79 
 
1. General Provisions regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
a) General Goals 
One of the aims of the EU is “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular 
through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual 
framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”80 
The goals of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are to protect „the common values, 
fundamental interests and independence of the Union“, to promote the security of the Union and 
                                                                                                                                                             
74  Treaty on European Union, Jul. 29, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992). 
75  Navarrete & Egea, supra note 12, at 52; Opi & Floyd, supra note 53, at 307. 
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77  Id. at 877. 
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the Member States, to keep peace and promote international security, thereby respecting the UN 
Charter, the principles laid down by the Helsinki Final Act and the goals of the Paris Charter, to 
support international cooperation, and to promote democracy and the rule of law, and to enhance 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.81 
b) Obligations of the EU Member States 
The Member States are expected to support the EU’s foreign and security policy and 
avoid any action which hampers the interests of the EU.82 Member States shall establish a 
process of mutual information and consultation within the Council regarding foreign and security 
policy.83 
Moreover, the TEU addresses the specific situation of the French Republic and the United 
Kingdom as permanent members84 of the UN Security Council: These two countries have the 
duty to inform the other EU countries and to promote the interests of the EU within the Security 
Council.85  
c) Competences of the European Institutions 
The EU and the Member States shall define a Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
act accordingly.86 The importance of the Member States becomes apparent when reading this 
particular provision, since the EU is not responsible for defining the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy alone, but only in conjunction with the Member States.  
                                                                                                                                                             
80  TEU art. B (as in effect 1993) (now art. 2). 
81  TEU art. J.1 (2) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 11 (1)). 
82  TEU art. J.1 (4) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 11 (2)). 
83  TEU art. J.2 (1) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 16). 
84  U.N. Charter art. 23 (1). 
85  TEU art. J.5 (4) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 19 (2)). 
86  TEU art. J.1 (1) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 11 (1)). 
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The European Council is responsible for defining the general guidelines of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. 87  Based on theses previously adopted general guidelines, the 
Council has to decide upon the further means to define and implement the policy goals, thereby 
generally using the principle of unanimity.88 
The Presidency of the Council was entrusted with the task of representing the EU in 
foreign and security policy affairs. 89  The Presidency is required to consult the European 
Parliament with respect to the main aspects of the foreign policy.90 Moreover, the Presidency has 
to consider the positions taken by the European Parliament and inform the directly elected body, 
which in addition has the right to ask questions of the Council. 91  By explicitly granting 
Parliament the right to ask questions, the TEU codifies the existing practice.92 
Finally, there shall be an annuall debate in the Parliament on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.93 The European Parliament has one specific power with respect to “operational 
expenditures” of the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Council has the competence to 
decide unanimously that the “purse” of the European Communities shall be charged with the 
expenses for a operation in the area of foreign and security policy.94 However, if the Council 
decides so, the ordinary procedure of the Treaty Establishing the European Community is 
applicable.95 In fact this means that the European Parliament has to approve such expenses, 
because the Parliament has the power to decide upon “non-compulsory funds”.96  It can be 
                                                 
87  TEU art. J.8 (1) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 13 (1)). 
88  TEU art. J.8 (2) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 13 (3)). 
89  TEU art. J.5 (1) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 18 (1)). 
90  TEU art. J.7 (as in effect 1993) (now art. 21)). 
91  Id. 
92  KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 59. 
93  TEU art. J.7 (as in effect 1993) (now art. 21)). 
94  TEU art. J.11 (2) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 28)). 
95  Id. 
96  Murphy, supra note 76, at 887-88; Opi & Floyd, supra note 53, at 308. 
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concluded that the position of the European Parliament is much weaker in the area of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, compared to the three European Communities.97 
It is important to emphasize that the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is 
exempted in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.98 Since there is no judicial 
way to force a Member State to comply with specific obligations in the foreign policy area, there 
is a possible credibility gap with respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.99 
d) Legal Instruments 
The Maastricht Treaty established the three instruments of “systematic cooperation”, 
“common position”, and “joint action”.100 The concept of systematic cooperation means that the 
Member States are obligated to consult each other and provide information with respect to 
foreign policy issues. 101  The Council has  to define common positions 102 , thereby acting 
unanimously.103 Common positions can be described as stating the Member States‘ position with 
respect to a certain foreign policy issue and often make sure that U.N. Security Council 
resolutions are complied with.104 So-called joint actions are decided upon by the Council based 
on the more general guidelines provided by the European Council.105 A joint action can be 
defined as “a specific action or activity undertaken by the Union in response to a foreign policy 
concern”.106 
 
 
                                                 
97  KAPTEYN &VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 9, at 59. 
98  TEU art. L (as in effect 1993) (now art. 46); cf. Opi & Floyd, supra note 53, at 311-12. 
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2. Defense and Security Policy under the Treaty of Maastricht 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy has to “include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might 
in time lead to a common defense.”107  
It is important to distinguish between the terms “common defense policy” and “common 
defense”: The former refers to a policy mechanism which would coordinate the individual 
defense policies of the Member States, whereas the latter denotes the possible concept of an 
integrated “European army”.108 A  majority vote as to joint actions in this crucial area, which 
affects the core of national sovereignty, is not possible under the Treaty of Maaastricht, thereby 
emphasizing the principle of unanimity.109 
The TEU established a link between the EU and the Western European Union: It provides 
that the EU may request the WEU to implement decisons with defense implications. The WEU is 
described as “an integral part of the development of the Union”.110 These provisions have to be 
seen before the background of the idea that the WEU may become the “European pillar” of 
NATO and the military wing of the EU at the same time.111 
The security and defense policy of the EU is probably seen as subordinate to NATO, 
because the EU security policy “shall respect“ the NATO obligations of some of the EU Member 
States.112 
                                                                                                                                                             
106  Murphy, supra note 76, at 880. 
107  TEU art. J.4 (1) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 17 (1)). 
108  Opi & Floyd, supra note 53, at 316. 
109  TEU arts. J.4 (3),  J.3 (as in effect 1993) (now art. 23 (2)). 
110  TEU art. J.4 (2) (as in effect 1993) (repealed by the Treaty of Nice). 
111  Cf. Swack, supra note 20, at 28-29. 
112  TEU art. J.4 (4) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 17 (1)). 
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Bilateral defense cooperation between EU Member States in the NATO or WEU 
framework is compatible with the TEU as long as this process does not hamper the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.113 
 
3. The Political Situation in the early 1990s with respect to Security Policy Issues 
When referring to the EU’s foreign and security policy, it is important to note that the EU 
Member States Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden are pursuing a policy of neutrality.114 
During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU was not able to act decisively. As a consequence 
of this failure, the three European middle powers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, 
together with the United States and Russia, took over so that as early as 1994 the EU was 
irrelevant. The five mentioned countries were known as the Contact Group, which tried to solve 
the crisis in former Yugoslavia.115 The Bosnian Serbs aggression was finally stopped by NATO 
and essentially by the USA.116 
In the early 1990s it had become clear that there was no longer the danger of a Soviet or 
Russian attack on Western Europe.117 The main threat to international security was caused by so-
called failing states and ethnic conflicts.118 Such conflicts require a military approach, which is 
completely different from that relied on during the Cold War.119 Therefore, the WEU Foreign 
and Defense Ministers acknowledged in the Petersberg Declaration in 1992 the importance of 
humanitarian and rescue tasks and the concepts of peacekeeping and peacemaking.120 The WEU 
was consequently given access to the capabilities of the Franco-German Corps, which later 
                                                 
113  TEU art. J.4 (5) (as in effect 1993) (now art. 17 (4)). 
114  DENZA, supra note 37, at 342. 
115  See GINSBERG, supra note 11, at 57-104; Opi & Floyd, supra note 53, at 317-18. 
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developed into the Eurocorps.121 The WEU was involved in the crisis in former Yugoslavia, 
because a WEU naval unit supervised the U.N. sanctions against Serbia.122 
 
G. The Treaty of Amsterdam123 
The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on October, 2, 1997.124 It went into force on May 1, 
1999.125 This treaty changed several provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the 
European Communities treaties.126 
 
1.  Important General Provisions as to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
The Treaty of Amsterdam established the office of the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.127 Currently Javier Solana is the incumbent.128 It is the 
duty of the High Representative to assist the Presidency and the Council in areas concerning the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 129  In particular, the High Representative must help 
develop and implement policy decisions and represent the Council while communicating with 
non-EU states. 130  The establishment of the High Representative has been decscribed as 
strenghtening the EU’s operational capacity.131 Furthermore, the High Represenative chairs a 
“Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit” which relies on personal ressources from the Member 
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States, the General Secretariat, the Commission, and the WEU.132 There are strong hopes that the 
new High Representative will enhance the visibility of the EU in foreign affairs.133 
There is a new instrument in the area of foreign policy: the so-called common strategy.134  
The Presidency is required to “consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the 
basic choices of the common foreign and security policy”.135 Moreover, the Presidency has to 
consider the positions held by the European Parliament and inform it of the implemented foreign 
policy.136 The Parliament still has the right to ask the Council questions regarding the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.137 Article 21 of the TEU in so far only repeats the provisions of Art. 
J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty.  
Article 23 of the TEU (as in effect 1999) deals with the voting process and allows the 
Council to act by qualified majority when it adopts joint actions, common positions or another 
decision, provided they are based on a common strategy138, which themselves are adopted by 
unanimity by the European Council.139 This majority rule also applies to the adoption of a 
decision which itself implements joint actions or common positions.140 Article 23 (1) of the TEU 
(as in neffect 1999) deals with abstentions and qualified abstentions, the latter being a possible 
way for a Member State to avoid being bound by a decision, which otherwise does bind the 
remaining Member States. 
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The idea behind the introduction of majority voting is that it is acceptable when it regards 
areas which are “within the framework of another upstream decision”.141 The option of qualified 
abstention provides an avenue to get out of an otherwise unsolvable crisis among Member States, 
which are unable to agree upon a particular issue.142 
 
2. Security and Defense Policy 
Article 2 of the TEU (as in effect 1999), which is the substitute for Article B of the 
Maastricht Treaty, provides that it is the goal of the EU “to assert its identity on the international 
scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy 
including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common 
defense”. Here it is possible to identify a slight change towards a more serious commitment to 
the establishment of a common defense, because the former Art. B stated that a common defense 
policy only “might in time lead to a common defense”.  
Article 11 (1) of the TEU (as in effect 1999) added as an objective of the EU the 
preservation of security on external borders. This provision also contains the following 
interesting change: Now the Union alone, not together with the Member States143, is in charge of 
defining and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
When defining the general guidelines of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the 
European Council also may refer to areas concerning defense policy,144 whereas Article J.8 (1) 
TEU (as in effect 1993) did not contain such a reference to defense policy. 
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The relatively far reaching procedures established in Article 23 (2) of the TEU for 
majority voting do not apply with respect to matters which relate to defense and military issues. 
This means that unanimity is required also in the Council of Ministers, when defense and 
military questions are at stake.145  
Article 17 (1) of the TEU (as in effect 1999) provides for some changes in the wording of 
former Article J.4 (1). Now the Common Foreign and Security Policy is directed towards “the 
progressive framing of a common defense policy ... which might lead to a common defense, 
should the European Council so decide“ instead of “the eventual framing of a common defense 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defense“. The new wording resembles the change 
of Article 2 of the TEU and thereby reiterates a stronger commitment of the Member States with 
regard to European defense policy. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam established therefore a “specific commitment” to the 
“progressive framing of a common defense policy”.146 Moreover, there is now a mechanism to 
get a European defense: Required is a unanimous decision by the European Council and 
ratification by the respective parliaments of the Member States.147 
The Union is to improve the institutional relations with the WEU.148 If the European 
Council had decided so, the full integration of the WEU in the EU system was under the 
Amsterdam Treaty possible.149 Article 17 (1) of the TEU (as in effect 1999) described the WEU 
as “an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an 
operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2”, which referred to the so-called 
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Petersberg tasks, e.g. peacekeeping and peacemaking. It has to be emphasized that it was not 
possible to integrate the WEU in the EU legal system during the negotiations of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, because the disagreement between the supporters of an autonomous WEU and the 
“integrationists” could not be overcome.150 
The Member States have committed themselves to the process of establishing a common 
defense policy by endeavouring to bring about more cooperation in the area of armaments.151 
Moreover, it has to be emphasized that Article 17 (1) of the TEU (as in effect 1999) 
acknowledges the commitments made by some Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty: 
The EU’s policy explicitly respect such obligations. This particular provision has been 
characterized as “presentional strenghtening of the deference to NATO”.152 Furthermore, Article 
17 (1) of the TEU (as in effect 1999) takes fully into account the situation of the neutral Member 
States, because it states that “(t)he policy of the Union ... shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States”. 
The so-called Petersberg tasks, which in 1992 have been decided upon by the Council of 
Ministers of the WEU, are now integrated into Article 17 (2) of the TEU (as in effect 1999).153 
These tasks contain humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and the establishment of 
combat forces for crisis management, especially peacemaking.154 The decision to include these 
kinds of military tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty has to be seen as a reaction to the devastating 
civil war in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.155  
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Article 17 (3) of the TEU (as in effect 1999, repeaaled by the Treaty of Nice) stated that 
the EU will use the WEU „to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which 
have defense implications“. Former Article J.4 (2) in contrast was less stringent, as it only said 
that the EU requests the WEU to implement defense related decisions. A very important 
provision can be found in Article 17 (4) of the TEU (as in effect 1999), which, in the framework 
of the WEU or NATO, enables an even closer cooperation of those Member States, which are 
willing to integrate more in the area of defense policy. 
Common Foreign and Security Policy operations cause expenses. Article 28 (3) of the 
TEU (as in effect 1999) stated as a general rule that the budget of the Communities has to take 
this financial burden. However, there is an exception for operations which have “military or 
defense implications”. In this situation, the Member States have to cover the expenses. However 
those states, that have qualified their abstention with respect to a particular operation, do not 
have to share the financial burden of such a operation.156 
It was very important for the credibility of the Common Foreign and Security Policy that 
the two currently most important European military powers, France and the UK, were able to 
present a Joint Declaration after their summit at St. Malo, which stressed that “the Union must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use 
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.157 
 
H. The Rapid Reaction Force 
The Cologne Summit of the EU’s Heads of State and Government, which started on June 
3, 1999, addressed the Kosovo conflict: European leaders came to the conclusion that Europe 
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itself must be able to handle such a devastating crisis, which entailed massive violations of 
human rights and caused numerous casualties among the civilian population.158 The decision to 
establish a EU Rapid Reaction Force was made at the Helsinki summit in 1999 and can be seen 
as a direct reaction to the Kosovo conflict.159 The Member States set themselves the goal to 
organize the Rapid Reaction Force by mid 2003; this military unit shall consist of 50,000 to 
60,000 soldiers from EU countries and shall be able to fulfill the so-called Petersberg tasks, 
which means inter alia peacekeeping and peacemaking. The force shall be ready for deployment 
within 60 days and capable of operating at least one year.160 It has to be emphasized that the 
Rapid Reaction Force is not a supranational European army, but will be a military force based on 
the decisions of the Member States to contribute to that unit.161 During the Helsinki European 
Council, the Member States did not make detailed commitments regarding their individual 
contributions to the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force. They only stated their Headline 
Goals.162  The EU countries made specific commitments during a capabilities conference in 
Brussels in November 2000.163 
 
I. The Treaty of Nice 
The Treaty of Nice was signed on February 26, 2001 and amends inter alia the Treaty on 
European Union.164 This treaty entered into force on February 1, 2003.165 
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The Treaty of Nice deleted the reference to the WEU in Article 17 (1) and (3) of the TEU. 
However, Article 17 (4) TEU (as in effect 2003) allows for closer cooperation among some 
Member States in the framework of the WEU. The abolishment of the WEU reference in Article 
17 (1) and (3) of the TEU shows that the European Council wants the EU itself to decide on 
military operations which are supposed to solve crisis situations and fulfil the so-called 
Petersberg tasks.166 Moreover, it can be inferred that the EU is determined to use the military 
capabilities of NATO to implement ist military decisions.167 
Article 25 of the TEU (as in effect 2003) now incorporates the Political and Security 
Committee, which has the duty to watch “the international situation in the areas covered by the 
common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering 
opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative”. The Political and 
Security Committee, under the auspices of the Council, is supposed to have strategic 
responsibility of “crisis management operations”. The competence of the Political and Security 
Committee to exert “day-to-day supervision” of such an operation was welcomed, because it 
grants operational responsibility to a body below the Council; a structure which has been 
described as crucial for an effective operation, especially in the area of the Petersberg tasks.168 
The Political and Security Committee was originally established by Council Decision of January 
22, 2001.169 It has the duty to analyze crisis situations and assess the options which may be 
chosen by the European Union to solve a particular crisis.170 Furthermore, the Political and 
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Security Committee is the body which has strategic direction over a military operation. 171 
Therefore, the Committee assesses the strategic military options, in particular, the chain of 
command and the operational concepts and plans. 172  Moreover, the Political and Security 
Committee has to promote the consultation mechanisms with NATO and third States.173 
By Council Decision of January 22, 2001, the Military Committee of the EU was 
established.174 According to Art. 1 of this Council Decision, the Military Committee consists of 
the Member States’ Chiefs of Defense, who are represented by their military representatives.175 
The Military Committee provides on the one hand advice concerning military affairs and 
recommendations to the Political and Security Committee, on the other hand it issues directions 
to the EU Military Staff.176 
By Council Decision of January 22, 2001, the Military Staff of the European Union was 
established.177 The Military Staff consists of military personnel from the Member States, which 
are seconded to the General Secretariat of the Council.178 There are three crucial functions of the 
Military Staff: Those are early warning, assessment of crisis situations, and the planning of 
military strategies.179 
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J. The Draft Constitution180 
1. Introduction 
The Nice Summit established the post-Nice process181, which was supposed to deal with 
the relationship between the EU and the Member States with respect to their particular 
competences, the position the national parliaments should have within the EU, the legal future of 
the Fundamental Rights Charter, and the simplification of the  existing treaties.182 
By the Laeken Declaration, the “Convention on the Future of Europe” was established to 
develop a Constitution for Europe.183 Former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaign was to 
become Chairman of the Convention, assisted by Vice-Chairmen Giuliano Amato from Italy and 
Jean-Luc Dehaene from Belgium.184 
The European Convention presented a Draft Constitution, which was approved by a 
broad consensus during the plenary session of the Convention on June 13, 2003.185 On June 20, 
2003, the European Convention submitted the text of the Draft Treaty to the European Council, 
which had gathered in Thessaloniki, Greece.186 
There was considerable optimism that the Draft Constitution would have been agreed 
upon by the European Council in Brussels in December 2003.  However, mainly due to unsolved 
disputes regarding a reform of the weighing of the Member States’ votes, it was not possible to 
reach an agreement on the Draft Constitution. Poland and Spain were seen as responsible for the 
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failure.187 It remains to be seen whether the Draft will be later accepted. The new government of 
Spain, led by the Socialist Party has articulated that it will change the position held by the former 
conservative government. Spain is probably going to support the Franco-German camp in the 
coming years. Nevertheless, the provisons in the Draft Constitution regarding the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy deserve to be assessed. 
 
2. General Provisions regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Aricle I-15 of the Draft Constitution states the general goals of the EU’s foreign and 
security policy: 
”1. The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall 
cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the 
progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense. 
2. Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union’s common foreign 
and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts 
adopted by the Union in this area. They shall refrain from any action contrary to the Union’s 
interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.” 
It is evident that a common European defense under the Draft treaty is still considered as 
a far away future project. The wording does not depict a stronger commitment to the 
establishment of a common defense, compared with the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. There 
is also no discernable improvement of commitment of the Member States regarding the common 
defense policy. The Amsterdam Treaty had already contained almost the same wording. 
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In the Draft Constitution, Articles III-195 to III-215 specifically deal with the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Article III-195 (1) provides that the EU “shall define and 
implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy covering all areas of foreign and security 
policy”. The Member States are obliged to support the common policy and to avoid action which 
may hamper the results of the EU’s foreign policy.188 According to Article III-196 (1) of the 
Draft Constitution, the European Council is responsible for defining the general guidelines for 
the EU’s foreign and security policy, including areas concerning defense policy. 
Most interestingly, the Draft Constitution provides for the establishment of a Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose responsibility is inter alia to preside over the Council of 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, to promote the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its 
implementation, and to represent the EU in the international community with respect to foreign 
and security policy, thereby being supported by a yet to be established European External Action 
Service.189 It is the duty of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs to consult the European 
Parliament with respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security 
and Defense Policy, thereby making sure that the views of the European Parliament are 
considered. 190 Furthermore, the Parliament is informed by the Foreign Affairs Minister of the 
conduct of the foreign and security policy.191 Article III-205 (2) of the Draft Constitution grants 
the European Parliament the right to interrogate the Council of Ministers and the Foreign Affairs 
Minister or submit recommendations to them. In contrast with Article 21 of the TEU, there has to 
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be now a debate on the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy at least twice a 
year.192 
A very interesting provision can be found in Article III-206 (2), which states that those 
Member States which are members of the UN Security Council “shall concert” and provide 
information to the other EU countries and the EU foreign minister. This provison further 
elaborates that the EU countries which are in the Security Council “will ... defend the positions 
and the interests of the Union”. If the EU has defined its own position in an area which is subject 
of the UN Security Council’s deliberations, the EU countries in the Security Council “shall 
request that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union’s position.”193 
It remains doubtful, whether – after a future ratification of this Draft Treaty – the two permanent 
European members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom and the French Republic194, 
will be willing to implement this decision. 
 
3. Specific Provisions regarding the Common Security and Defense Policy 
The Draft Treaty contains with Articles III-210 to III-214 specific provisions regarding 
the Common Security and Defense Policy. Moreover, Article I-40 of the Draft Constitution is 
important, because this provision refers to the implementation of the Common Security and 
Defense Policy. 
One provision from the general section of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Chapter of the Draft Constitution is essential for the Common Security and Defense Policy: 
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Article III-201 (4) of the Draft Constitution makes it clear that there will be no qualified majority 
voting195 by the Council of Ministers on decisions which relate to defense and military matters. 
Article III-215  (2), which is in the “Financial Provisions”-section of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy Chapter of the Draft Constitution, provides that operations related to 
military or defense issues must be financed by the Member States and not by the EU budget. 
Countries that have used the tool of qualified abstention with respect to a military operation are 
not required to participate in financing such military operations.196 
The Common Security and Defense Policy is considered as an “integral part” of the more 
general common foreign policy of the EU.197 The EU is supposed to engage in peace-keeping 
missions outside the territory of the EU, thereby emphasizing its desire to promote international 
security, while abiding by the rules of the UN Charter. 198  Article III-210 (1) of the Draft 
Constitution specifies the tasks of Artcle I-40 by listing the following operations: “(J)oint 
disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, 
conflict prevention, and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation.” These tasks are commonly known as the 
Petersberg tasks. By implementing these tasks, the EU may support the fight against terrorism.199 
By unanimity, the Council of Ministers can adopt European decisions implementing the above 
mentioned tasks.200 
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A common defense is possible, should the European Council, by unanimity, agree upon 
such a project.201 The European Council shall make a recommendation to the Member States to 
adopt the decision to establish a common European defense. 202 The Draft Constitution explicitly 
acknowledges the constitutional requirements of the EU Member States, which have to be 
fulfilled before establishing a common European defense.203 When looking at the divergent 
views within the EU as to the notion of an “ever closer Union”, one might doubt seriously the 
prospects of a common European defense. 
According to Article I-40 (3) of the Draft Constitution, the Member States are required to 
provide civilian and military capabilities for the fulfilment of the EU’s Common Security and 
Defense Policy. The Council of Ministers can by unanimity, adopt a European decision, which 
executes the Common Security and Defense Policy.204  
With respect to the involvement of the European Parliament, Article I-40 (8) provides 
that it “shall be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common 
Security and Defense Policy, and shall be kept informed of how it evolves”. This, in fact means, 
that EU military operations do not need approval by the European Parliament. 
Since it is realistic to assume that not every Member State of the EU may have the 
capabilities and the political will to engage in military operations, Article III-211 of the Draft 
Constitution was created to expressly allow the Council of Ministers to entrust the fulfillment of 
a specific military task to certain Member States who are willing to engage in such operation. 
Article III-212 of the Draft Constitution provides for the establishment of a European 
Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency. The agency will have the duty to help 
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to identify military capability goals, to support the development of compatible procurement by 
the Member States, to promote cooperation of the Member States with respect to improvement of  
their military capabilities, to contribute to research projects in the area of defense technology and 
to promote cooperation among the Member States in this crucial field, to support the 
development of military technology for “future operational needs”, and to promote the industrial 
and technological situation of the defense industry.205 If Europe really wants to play a larger role 
in international affairs, it definitively has to improve the military technology its national armies 
use. During the Kosovo war, the inferiority of the EU countries to the US armed forces was 
significant and led European leaders to be very concerned about that development.206 Germany’s 
Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, was cited as stating the following: “The Kosovo war was 
mainly an expression of Europe’s own insufficiency and weakness; we as Europeans never could 
have coped with the Balkan wars that were caused by Milosevic without the help of the US.”207 
Former Chairman of NATO’s military committee, German General Klaus Naumann, said that 
soon Europeans and Americans “will not even be able to fight on the same battlefield”.208 These 
statements confirm the urgent need for Europeans to increase spending on the development of 
modern military technology. The establishment of the Armaments Agency is therefore a very 
important step forward. 
Those EU Member States that have more advanced military capabilities and are ready to 
be involved in military operations of the highest level may establish so-called “structured 
cooperation” among them.209 The Council of Ministers may request those countries taking part in 
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structured cooperation to execute a “Petersberg task operation”. 210  Furthermore, the Draft 
Constitution provides for the concept of “closer cooperation on mutual defense”: Participation in 
such close cooperation shall be possible for every Member State.211 The concept of “closer 
cooperation on mutual defense” is deemed to be a temporary one, lasting until a true common 
European defense has been established.212 The Member States, that are willing to cooperate in 
this area, are, by entering into closer cooperation, creating a defense agreement, since they are 
obliged to provide aid and assistance, including military help, to a participating country that had 
been attacked by a third state.213  
Judicial review is still not going to be established in the field of the foreign and security 
policy: Art. III-282 of the Draft Constitution excludes the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice with respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
K. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy Operations 
So far, four Common Foreign and Security Policy operations have been launched. Three 
of them are related to the region of former Yugoslavia and reflect the EU’s willingness to 
promote stability in its neighborhood. The remaining operation was conducted in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and is an example of the EU’s determination to take responsibility for peace 
and stability in Africa. 
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1. EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
On January 1, 2003, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched, 
taking over the role of the UN International Police Task Force.214 The Police Mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was set up by Council decision from March 11, 2002, and was approved by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1396 from March 5, 2002.215 The conduct of the Police Mission is 
supervised by Special Representative Lord Ashdown.216 There is a three year time limit for this 
particular mission.217 The purpose of the EU Police Mission is to set up “policing arrangements 
under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice”.218 The EU 
itself describes its mission as important proof of the development of the European Security and 
Defense Policy.219 
 
2. Operation Concordia 
The European Union conducted a military operation, code-named Concordia, in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the request of Macedonia’s President Trajkovski.220 
The military operation replaced the NATO operation on March 31, 2003 and was legally 
justified by UN Security Council Resolution 1371.221 The operation ended on December 15, 
2003.222 Thirteen of the EU Member States contributed to the operation, whose goal was to 
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promote stability and security in Macedonia.223 This military operation is also an important step 
for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to approach EU integration.224 
 
3. Operation Artemis 
The EU conducted a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, named 
operation Artemis, relying on UN Security Coucil Resolution 1484 from May 30, 2003.225 
Within the EU, the legal basis for the launch of the operation was a Council decision on June 12, 
2003. 226  The military operation lasted until September 1, 2003. 227  The Security Council 
Resolution allowed the “deployment of an interim emergency multinational force” to promote 
the security and humanitarian situation in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo. 228  The 
“Framework Nation” for this military operation was France.229 
 
4. Proxima Mission 
On December 15, 2003, the EU launched an EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, which followed the military operation in that country.230 The so-called 
Proxima Mission will last one year and aims at helping the country to establish European 
policing standards by advicing and mentoring the country’s police.231 
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Chapter III 
War Powers under the U.S. Constitution: An Analysis of the Legal Framework 
A sound analysis of the legal framework regarding the war powers under the U.S. 
constitution has to start with the text of the Constitution itself.232 
 
A. The Language of the Constitution regarding War Powers and Defense Policy 
1. The Constitution and Congress 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides inter alia that Congress shall have the 
power to “provide for the common Defense”, to “declare War”, “to raise and support Armies”, to 
“provide and maintain a Navy”, “to make Regulation of the ...land and naval forces”, “to provide 
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions” and “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to 
the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia 
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress”. 
 
2. The Constitution and the President 
The powers granted to the President are to be found in Article II of the Constitution. 
Article II, section  1, clause 1 states that “the executive power shall be vested in” the President. 
With respect to the war powers of the Constitution, Article II, section 2, clause 1 of the 
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Constitution has to be considered the most important provision: It makes the President the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.  
 
3. Assessment 
After a short glance, one might come to the conclusion that the President is more or less 
the “agent of the legislature”, who only executes the will of Congress regarding military 
operations.233 But, in fact, the President, and not Congress, has evolved as the dominant figure in 
the American political system when it comes to the area of war powers and foreign affairs in 
general.234 The Supreme Court has characterized the President “as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations”.235 
 
B. The Role of the President with Respect to War Powers and Security Policy 
1. The Executive Power of the President 
Article II, section 1, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests the executive power in the 
President. It was stated very early by Alexander Hamilton that the Constitution thereby granted 
to the President complete authority over the foreign affairs field, with the few express exceptions 
of the text of the Constitution.236 However, the Supreme Court has so far not considered Article 
II, section 1, clause1 of the U.S. Constitution as providing the President with certain explicitly 
defined foreign affairs competences.237  
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2. The President as the “Sole Organ” with respect to foreign affairs 
a) A Source of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power 
The famous statement made by John Marshall in the House of Representatives that the 
President is the “sole organ of the nation in its external relations”238 is often cited and used as a 
source to claim great Presidential powers.239 That the President can claim foreign affairs powers 
under Article II, section 1, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution might be widely accepted, however, 
it is very unclear what powers precisely this provision does grant to the Commander-in-Chief.240  
b) Presidential Practice 
In the past, Presidents have decided whether the United States should be neutral in armed 
conflicts involving other countries, but it is now Congress that issues resolutions on neutrality.241 
Nevertheless, Presidents have continued to argue that they have retained the right to decide 
neutrality.242 Furthermore, Presidents have based the statement of security doctrines on their 
broad and general foreign affairs power.243 
 
3. The President as the Commander-in-Chief 
That the President is the Commander-in-Chief establishes civilian control of the armed 
forces.244 It is up to the President to decide whether to be personally involved with the details of 
an ongoing military campaign.245 After hostilities have started, it is up to the President to decide 
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on the strategic and tactical aspects of the conflict and the direction of the armed forces.246 It is 
nevertheless very important to bear in mind that Congress has – through its power to declare war 
– the possibility to identify the strategic goals of a campaign.247 
As noted above, Congress was granted the power to declare war. This entails the 
conclusion that Congress was not given the power to “make war”.248 This interpretation can be 
butressed by the fact that an earlier draft of the Constitution explicitly granted Congress the 
power to “make” war. 249  As the U.S. Constitution refrains from using this wording, some 
constitutional lawyers argue that the framers changed their mind about who shall be in charge of 
conducting a military operation.250  
However, it has been stressed that the unsatisfying experiences of war conducted by 
Congress, according to the Articles of Confederation, in the aftermath of U.S. independence, led 
the framers to the decision to establish Presidential control of military action.251 It has to be 
emphasized that the President has been given only “tactical control” of a military operation and 
that such control does not entail the right to start hostilities.252 
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4. The President’s Power to deploy U.S. troops and the Relationship with Congress 
a) The Situation of an Armed Attack on the Territory of the U.S. 
(1) The Presidential Right to Repel Sudden Attacks 
It has been stated that the President has the right to “repel sudden attacks”.253 Such a right 
of self-defense cannot be found explicitly in the language of the Constitution, but it has been said 
that such power has been granted impliedly to the President by the framers.254 The right to repel 
attacks on the United States has been described as originating from the law of nature and from 
the concept of self-preservation.255 
(2) The Scope of such a Right 
Although it is not doubtful that the President may launch a defensive war in the case of an 
attack, the question remains how far the President may go when repelling such an attack.256 
Justice Paterson said in United States v. Smith that the President has the right to send troops also 
to the attacking country if the previous attack was of a severe nature.257 Such a broad conception 
of the President’s power to repel an attack would be quite far reaching. However, since Congress 
has the spending power, it has the de facto possibility to stop an expanding defensive war 
launched by the President.258 Moreover, the President cannot use the power to repel an attack to 
make an intervention in a foreign war or to start  a military operation abroad which he deems to 
                                                                                                                                                             
252  JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND 
ITS AFTERMATH, 5 (1993). 
253  Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE 
POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, 30 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. 
Halperin,eds., 1994); FISHER, supra note 244 , at 6-7 (1995); RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON 
WARS: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND WAR POWERS, 6 (2002). 
254  Id. 
255  United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). 
256  Raven-Hansen, supra note 253, at 35-36. 
257  Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230. 
258  Raven-Hansen, supra note 253, at 36-37. 
 44
be in the best security interest of the United States. 259  The controversial War Powers 
Resolution260 also acknowledges in Sec. 2 (c) such a defensive power of the President in the case 
of an attack on the U.S. soil or its troops. 
Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that the President’s defensive power has been cited to 
provide a legal basis for a rescue operation of U.S. citizens in foreign countries.261 The reliance 
on this legal basis has been criticized as not accurate. Instead, one may look at diverse legislative 
acts of Congress, such as the so-called “Hostage Act”, which deal with the problem and thereby 
establish proof of some kind of acquiescence by Congress for rescue operations.262 The “Hostage 
Act” has been described as authorizing the President to resort to the use of U.S. armed forces for 
rescue operations.263 Moreover, the whole bunch of legislation in this area was seen as providing 
“collateral evidence of congressional acquiescence”.264 
b) Military Actions “short of war” 
Presidents have sent U.S. troops into military hostilities in over three hundred cases 
without any form of Congressional authorization.265 However, in such events, Presidents have 
usually argued that the deployment of the troops was for goals “short of war”.266 
This line of argumentation leads to the question: what is the meaning of the term “war” in 
the U.S. Constitution? It has been argued that the Constiution used the term “war” only with 
respect to “real” and broad hostilities, where two nations are totally involved in such an armed 
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conflict.267 Another position taken with regard to this question is that “war” refers only to 
hostilities where there has been a declaration of war.268 
An analysis of the whole text of the constitution provides help. Article I, section 8, clause 
11 of the Constitution states that Congress has the power to declare war and the power to grant 
so-called letters of marque and reprisals. The term “marque” is of French origin and 
interchangeable with “reprisal”; both terms refer to the seizure of property, which belongs to an 
enemy, as a reaction to the conduct of the adversary.269 Since the Constitution explicitly grants to 
Congress the right to declare war and the competence to issue letters of reprisals, it can be 
concluded that other powers, which may encompass actions short of a full scale war, belong to 
the President.270 It has been argued therefore that all military powers not specifically mentioned 
fall within the scope of the general foreign affairs power of the President.271 
Consequently, the President is empowered to use the military for actions short of war. 
However, also at this stage, it is necessary to define the meaning of the term “war”. Here, an 
historic approach to the interpretation of the Constitution may find it appropriate to look at the 
understanding of this word in the 18th century by legal scholars.272 In this particularly period, war 
was understood to denote the use of military force by one state against another.273 As a result of 
his interpretation of this term of the Constitution, the President should according to Professor 
Ramsey not alone decide upon the invasion of another sovereign state.274 Professor Ramsey 
mentions the following examples of Presidential action as justified: Military deployments that 
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are not an attack on a foreign nation as for example a peacekeeping operation upon the consent 
of the respective state; limited military operations to rescue U.S. citizens who are in danger in a 
foreign country; and the deployment of troops merely to threaten or intimidate another state.275  
The practice of U.S. Presidents276 indicates that they see themselves as having the sole 
responsibility to decide on the use of the armed fores for actions “short of war”.277 But this 
concept may be seen as a disguise, which allows Presidents to act without Congressional 
approval. Professor Henkin wrote that “the line between war and lesser uses of force is often 
elusive, sometimes illusory, and the use of force for foreign policy purposes can almost 
imperceptibly become a national commitment to war”.278 
c) Offensive Military Action 
Much more controversial is the question of whether the President may wage an offensive 
military action without congressional approval. Among U.S. constitutional lawyers, there are at 
least two identifiable broad camps, which have different opinions regarding this very important 
legal and political question. On the one hand, there is a pro-Congressional view arguing that 
Congressional approval is absolutely necessary, on the other hand, there is a pro-Presidential or 
pro-executive position which generally does not see Congressional authorization as a necessary 
element for the constitutionality of the offensive deployment of U.S. troops.279 The two groups 
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can be also distinguished by their understanding of the meaning and importance of a 
Congressional declaration of war.280 
(1) Pro Congress View 
(a) Historic Background 
One view of whether the President can act unilaterally stresses that the Founding Fathers 
clearly distinguished between military actions of an offensive character and those of a defensive 
character.281 The historic record is interpreted as granting the President the unlimited power only 
to “repel sudden attacks”.282  All other military actions which cannot be considered as self 
defense therefore require congressional authorization.283 
(b) The War Powers Resolution and the Interpretation of the Constitution 
The War Powers Resolution also states the view that there is a need for Congressional 
approval of military action of an offensive nature.284  Constitutional lawyers who espouse the 
pro-Congressional view have put forward convincing arguments based on the Constitution and 
its framing history for their position: 
The Constitution in Article I, section 8, clause 11 grants to Congress the power to declare 
war. Legal scholars interpreting this clause have pointed out that, already in the 16th century, the 
terms “declare” and “commence” were interchangeable, which means that it is up to Congress 
alone to decide upon the initiation of an offensive military action.285 Proponents of this view hold 
that “declaring war” was understood in the 18th century as a formal statement not only of starting 
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but also of waging war. 286  In this context, pro-Congressional lawyers cite John Locke’s 
statement that war can be declared “by Word or Action”.287 
There are convincing reasons which led the Framers of the Constitution to give Congress 
the power to decide on the initiation of war: They often made it clear that they did not want such 
an important decision to be taken too easily.288 By demanding Congressional rather than single 
Presidential approval, the Founders thought that there would be fewer military actions. 289 
Another argument to require both the Senate and the House of Representatives to decide, is 
based on the fact that such a procedure takes more time and therefore allows for a more thorough 
debate.290 Moreover, the requirement that especially the House of Representatives has to assent, 
was supposed to draw more popular support for a military operation.291 
The pro-Congressional view therefore requires Congressional authorization for the start 
of a military operation.292 The question remains whether Congress has the constitutional duty to 
make a formal declaration of war. Sidak argues that a formal declaration is necessary because it 
would promote political accountability and fulfil the “representative function” of Congress. A 
clear statement leaves no ambiguity and makes it much easier to verify whether the executive’s 
conduct lives up to the purposes of the declared war.293 
Henkin says that such a proposal goes too far: There is no basis for such demand. 
Congress has the right to make a formal or informal decision on the question of authorization of 
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a war.294 Such approval can be issued explicitly or impliedly by legislation, resolution, or simply 
by providing the necessary funds for a military operation.295 Henkin refers to the the undeclared 
Franco-American war in 1800.296 During the Franco-American conflict, President Adams did not 
want to formally declare war on France.297 Instead he made Congress authorize military action 
against France without a formal declaration of war.298 
The Supreme Court in Bas v. Tingy299 impliedly accepted that the United States was 
engaged in hostilities with a foreign power without a prior Congressional declaration of war: The 
Court had to decide whether France could be regarded as an “enemy” under a U.S. statute. It was 
argued that this cannot be said, because there was no declaration of war against France. The 
Court held that France was an “enemy” under the law, because there were hostilities, albeit the 
scope of the military conflict was limited. The war was deacribed as of a “limited nature”.300 It 
has been inferred from this decision that the Court therefore accepted the concept of “undeclared 
war”.301 
(2) Pro President View 
The opposite view relies on Article II, section 1 and 2 of the Constitution to argue that the 
President has broad constitutional power to conduct military operations that he considers to be 
necessary to encounter possible threats to U.S. foreign policy.302 It is asserted, that in the time 
period of the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the executive was widely seen as responsible 
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for starting and conducting military actions.303 From this point of view, the President also has the 
right to engage in preemptive strikes against alleged threats to U.S. security interests.304 The 
President can rely on his broad constitutional powers as the Chief-Executive and the 
Commander-in-Chief to use a preemptive strike to encounter a possible terrorist threat.305 
Professor Yoo and Deputy General Counsel Delahunty cite inter alia the Supreme Court 
decision in the Prize Cases306, which stated that President Lincoln’s decision to erect a blockade 
was to be solely decided by himself.307 The Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald stated that 
taking care of the national security lies at the core of the Presidential duties and competences.308 
However, this case concerned the immunity of White House aides to President Nixon.309 The 
cited statement is therefore only an obiter dictum. 
Professor Yoo argues that an analysis of the language of the Constitution as a whole 
supports Presidential priority310: Article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution which gives 
Congress the power to declare war and Article II, section 1 and 2, which make the President the 
Chief-Executive and the Commander-in-Chief, do not contain very detailed provisions with 
respect to the initiation of military action.311 If the Framers intended to grant  Congress the 
power to start hostilities, then they would have inserted specific language as they did, for 
example, with respect to the treaty power in Article II, section 2 and Article I, section 10, and 
                                                 
303  Id. 
304  Id. at 487. 
305  Id. at 516. 
306  The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 670 (1862). 
307  Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 245, at 490. 
308  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 n.19 (1982). 
309  Id. at 800. 
310  Yoo, War Powers, supra note 279, at 1674-75.; Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 267, at 1691-92. 
311  Id. 
 51
they would have used the verb “engage” instead of “declare”, as they did in Article I, section 10, 
clause 3.312  
It has also been emphasized that  the Constitution of South Carolina, at the time of the 
creation of the federal Constitution, contained the requirement of legislative authorization for 
“warmaking” by the Governor.313 This fact has been mentioned to argue that the Framers, if they 
really had the desire to secure Congressional approval of “warmaking”, would have chosen to 
insert more detailed language in the U.S. Constitution.314 A comparison with the Constitution of 
South Carolina does not really provides a convincing argument for the pro-Presidential position 
remains. The U.S. Constitution should be construed with respect to its historic background alone. 
According to Professor Yoo, the text of the Constitution amply demonstrates that the Framers 
were inserting explicit reference to a Congressional participation with respect to a particular 
executive conduct when they deemed that to be desirable.315 
Although today’s international lawyers use “declare” interchangeably with “commence”, 
in the 18th century, the concept “to declare a war” was understood to be of an almost judicial 
nature, thereby making it clear that a “perfect” war under international law has been started, 
which entailed the notion that this “fully” transferred a peaceful relation into one of war.316 
It has also been stressed that in the course of Anglo-American constitutional history the 
competence to start military action had always belonged to the executive branch.317 The 18th 
century English Kings had the power to initiate hostilities, to declare war, and to be in charge of 
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the military command.318 According to Professor Yoo, the framers of the U.S. Constitution were 
influenced by the English model.319 
Professor Yoo criticizes the pro-Congressional position as contradictory: Pro-
Congressional lawyers argue that “the power to declare war” entails the power to decide upon 
the start of hostilities, which makes some kind of Congressional authorization necessary for the 
deployment of U.S. troops to be constitutional. 320 These lawyers therefore rely on the one hand 
on the “declaration of war-clause”, on the other hand they do not require a formal declaration of 
war by Congress, but are only demanding some kind of previous Congressional approval.321 It 
has been proposed that Congress’ “power of the purse” is instead an appropriate and effective 
means to guarantee legislative control over Presidential warmaking.322 
Yoo interprets the Constitution as providing pragmatic flexibility in warmaking.323 He 
and Delahunty say that “centralization of authority in the President” may guarantee “unity in 
purpose and energy in action”.324 Moreover, the Chief-Executive clause of Article II, section 1 is 
understood to grant all not specifically mentioned executive powers to the President; the power 
to send troops into combat is seen as belonging to the executive branch.325 The use of military 
force is a “central tool for the exercise of the President’s plenary control over the conduct of 
foreign policy”.326 Allowing the legislative branch the final say when it comes to the initiation of 
hostilities would hamper the President’s responsibility in the area of foreign affairs.327 
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(3) Comment 
An assessment of the two different positions has to emphasize the political nature of the 
issue. In the aftermath of the devastating war in Viet Nam, which led the U.S. into a identity 
crisis, the position of the President was weakened; Congress gained more political power. The 
enactment of the War Powers Resolution is an example for Congress becoming more confident. 
Currently, however, the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, have 
changed U.S. politics. Strong leadership by the President seems to be appreciated by the 
American people. This political background may influence the interpretation of the war powers 
of the Constitution in a way that strenghtens the position of the President.  
 
C. The War Powers Resolution328 
1. The Content of the War Powers Resolution 
The Congress of the United States enacted the famous War Powers Resolution on 
November 7, 1973. The joint resolution by the Senate and the House of Representatives aims at 
making sure that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is reflected in the practice of the 
respective organs of the U.S. political system. 329  It purports to secure that the “collective 
judgements” of both the President and Congress is sending U.S. troops into hostilities.330  
According to Sec. 2 (c) of the War Powers Resolution, the President may deploy troops, 
where hostilities are expected to occur imminently only when war has been declared, when there 
is a specific statutory authorization, or when there has been an attack on the United States, its 
territories, or its troops. 
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The President has a duty to consult with Congress before sending troops into military 
conflicts and continue to do so when the armed forces are engaged in hostilities.331 When the 
President deploys U.S. armed forces in the absence of a formal declaration of war in “situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances”, or sends 
them to a foreign nation with combat equipment, or substantially increases the number of already 
deployed troops, Sec. 4 (a) requires him to report to Congress within 48 hours on the 
cirumstances requiring the deployment of U.S. troops, the purported constitutional or statutory 
authority for such deployment, and the probable scope of the military engagement. 
If within sixty days after submission of such a report, Congress has not declared war,  
enacted another form of legislative authorization, extended the time limit, or is unable to gather, 
the President shall withdraw the troops.332 
The provision of Sec. 5 (c) of the War Powers Resolution makes the U.S. armed forces a 
“congressional army”, since it provides that the President shall withdraw the troops if Congress 
demands so by concurrent resolution; however, this competence of Congress requires that there 
is no declaration of war or another legislative authorization. 
The War Powers Resolution provides some guidance for its interpretation in Sec. 8: It 
shall not be possible to infer from any provision of a statute the authority to introduce troops into 
hostilities when there is no specific and clear statement in the law saying so.333 Moreover, it is 
not possible to infer such authority from a ratified treaty, unless there is national legislation 
implementing such treaty and thereby specifically allowing for the deployment of U.S. armed 
forces.334 
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2. Comments and Critique on the War Powers Resolution 
The War Powers Resolution was controversial from the moment it had been enacted.335 It 
was enacted in light of the devastating experience in Viet Nam, 336  and President Nixon’s 
weakness due to the Watergate affair.337 President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution.338 
The denotation as a “resolution” is misleading; in fact the War Powers Resolution is “real law”, 
since the Senate and the House enacted it and overrode the President’s veto.339 
Presidents Ford and Carter complied with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution 
but did not openly state that it was a wholly constitutional law.340 None of the U.S. Presidents in 
office since the enactment has accepted the sixty days time limit for withdrawal of U.S. forces.341 
President Reagan made no public statement that he was bound by the provisions of the 
resolution.342  However, there is a record of Reagan Administration reports, which describe 
military action as “consistent with the ... Resolution”.343 President George H.W. Bush filed a 
report regarding the Panama operation in 1989 which also contained a reference to the War 
Powers Resolution. 344  The Clinton Administration also tried to comply with essential 
requirements of the resolution while emphasizing the legal opinion that the President does not 
need Congressional authorization for every kind of military operation.345 
Professor Rotunda criticizes the Resolution for allowing the President to deploy troops 
only where there has been either a declaration of war or another kind of legislative authorization 
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or a sudden attack on the United States.346 However, there are countless other cases where the 
President has used the military: rescue operations of U.S. citizens in foreign countries, protection 
of U.S. embassies, enforcement of ceasefires, and the fulfilment of treaty obligations.347  
Sec. 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires consultation with Congress prior to the 
introduction of U.S. armed forces only, when doing so, is “possible”.348 Professor Rotunda views 
this consultation requirement as a “sound one” because it lives up to the President’s reponsibility 
to explain his actions to the U.S. citizens in an open and clear way.349 
Sec. 5 (b) of the War Powers Resolution obliges the President to withdraw the troops if 
Congress does not authorize the deployment, but Rotunda stresses the fact that there are many 
cases where the President and Congress have simply ignored the provision.350 He points out that 
Sec. 5 (b) allows Congress to achieve a significant political result by doing nothing, and grants 
the President two months to use the military as he sees fit.351 At the end of the two months a 
concurrent resolution by Congress is according to Sec. 5 (c) sufficient to bind the President to 
withdraw the troops, and serves as what Rotunda calls a “legislative veto”.352 The Supreme Court 
held in INS v. Chadha that all legislative vetoes are unconstitutional. 353  Consequently, 
constitutional lawyers have concluded that Sec. 5 (c) of the War Powers Resolution may be seen 
as unconstitutional.354  
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D. Judicial Control of the President’s Use of the U.S. Armed Forces 
As early as 1849, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Luther v. Borden that the President’s 
decision to introduce armed forces to hostilities is a political question and is consequently not 
reviewable by the Court.355 However John Hart Ely says he does not “recommend that judges 
decide what wars we should and shouldn’t fight – not because I think they’d necessarily do it 
worse than anybody else, but rather (to risk sounding naive) because it simply isn’t their job. ... 
But if the courts’ relative insulation from the democratic process suggests that it is no business of 
theirs to decide what wars we fight, it does situate them uniquely well to police malfunctions in 
that process ... The courts have no business deciding when we get involved in combat, but they 
have every business insisting that the officials the Constitution entrusts with that decision be the 
ones who make it”.356 
During the first decades of U.S. constitutional history, the courts were important players 
in deciding the legality of executive branch decisions to initiate hostilities.357 In the famous case 
Bas v. Tingy, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the decision made by John Adams to 
pursue an undeclared war with France.358 The Court established a clearly deferential position in 
1936 in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,359 where it held that the President is the 
“sole organ” in foreign affairs.360 During the Viet Nam war, courts held that warmaking is a 
“political question” and dismissed lawsuits challenging the war.361 The following two decisions 
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by federal courts provide good examples of the judicial branch’s current approach towards the 
question of judicial review in the area of war powers. 
 
1. Dellums v. Bush 
Dellums v. Bush involved events leading up to the 1991 Gulf war. There, in dicta, Judge 
Harold H. Greene of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia however, held open the 
possibility that courts can address certain aspects of the decision to initiate a war.362 Fifty-three 
members of the House of Representatives and one United States Senator sought to enjoin the 
President from starting military action against Iraq without either a formal declaration of war or 
some other kind of authorization by Congress.363  
The Department of Justice argued that the issue was a political question, since the “design 
of the Constitution is to have the various  war- and military-related provisions construed and 
acting together, and ... their harmonization is a political rather than a legal question”.364  
Judge Greene responded that, if the executive branch could decide alone on military 
action Congress’ power to declare war would depend on the mercy of the executive, a result that 
would “evade the plain language of the Constitution”.365 He thought, the fact that hundreds of 
thousands U.S. troops were massed at the border of Iraq made this  a war in the sense of Article I, 
section 8 of the Constitution.366 This being the case, a Congressional declaration of war would be 
necessary before initiating hostilities.367 However, he refused to grant the injunction, because the 
action was not ripe for two reasons: First “Congress itself has provided no indication whether it 
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deems such a declaration either necessary, on the one hand, or imprudent, on the other”.368 
Second, it was not clear whether the President had made the final decision to go to war with Iraq 
because there were still diplomatic efforts underway to solve the crisis peacefully.369 
President George Bush subsequently asked on January 8, 1991 for congressional 
authorization.370 Congress passed the “Iraq Resolution”371, which granted authorization for the 
use of force. 
Professor Koh welcomed the district court’s decision but criticized Judge Greene for 
dismissing the suit. He argues that ripeness cannot be denied when “the Executive branch has 
clearly committed itself to a course of action”. 372  He thought that  the case was ripe for 
adjudication, since the chances of a military conflict were quite high in December 1990; as a 
remedy the district court might have remanded the case to Congress, thereby requiring the 
President to bring the question to Congress.373  
John Hart Ely believed the most important part of Judge Greene’s opinion was the 
statement that President Bush would violate the U.S. Constitution if he started hostilities without 
Congressional approval.374 However, Ely stressed the fact that other courts may come to other, 
more deferential results, especially when one considers the latest appointments to the federal 
courts.375  
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2. Campbell v. Clinton 
Twenty-six members of the House of Representatives sought a declaratory judgment that 
President William J. Clinton had violated the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution, when 
- without Congressional approval -  he ordered U.S. forces to participate in the air attack on the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that began on March 24, 1999, under the auspices of NATO.376  
District Judge Friedman dismissed the suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing.377 
He stated that a member of Congress can claim standing only when they “demonstrate that there 
is a true “constitutional impasse” or “actual confrontation” between the legislative and executive 
branches .378 
He found that Congressional resolutions, bills, and acts of appropriation showed that 
there was no real confrontation between the President and the legislative branch.379 The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision.380 The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certioari.381 
This case made it clear that it will not be easy for a minority of Congressmen to get a  
federal court decision on the merits of a dispute which is related to the President’s decison to 
initiate hostilities. 
 
E. The Power of the Purse 
During the Constitutional Convention, George Mason emphasized that the purse and the 
sword should never be united.382 Also, Madison and other delegates were convinced that it was 
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beneficial for constitutional liberties to insure that the power of the Commander-in-Chief was not 
given to the same institution that has the competence to decide upon the funding of military 
operations.383 
The spending power of Congress in Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution 
provides that “(n)o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and 
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time”. Article I, section 8, 
clause 1 provides that Congress has the power “to lay and collect Taxes ... to ... provide for the 
common Defense”, “to raise and support Armies” and “to provide and maintain a Navy”.384 The 
Constitution establishes a two-year time limit on the appropriation of money for the army385, 
thereby securing congressional control over the military. It cannot be denied that the President 
has a “strong voice” regarding the particular amount of defense expenditures; nevertheless it is 
up to Congress to make the final decision as to the spending.386  
Moreover, Congress can attach conditions to the use of the public money even if the 
funding is related to a situation which deeply involves the Commander-in-Chief.387 Fisher cites 
examples which demonstrate the power of Congress with respect to the funding of military 
operations:388 Among them is that of Congress utilizing its spending power to stop the U.S. 
involvement in Southeast Asia in 1973. 389  In 1993, Congress even set a deadline for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia by writing into the appropriation bill that no money can 
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be spent on military operations in Somalia after March 31, 1994, unless the President otherwise 
secures new congressional approval for such action.390 
The requirement of Congressional funding also has great political importance. Seeking 
congressional support promotes public understanding and acceptance of military 
involvements.391 
 
F. The USA and the United Nations 
1. The United Nations as a System of Collective Security 
As a response to World War II, several nations joined in creating the U.N. as a means of 
collective security, in hope of avoiding the failure of the League of Nations.392 Art. 2 (4) of the 
U.N. Charter provides: 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter nevertheless acknowledges the right of individual and 
collective self-defense. Art. 42 of the U.N. Charter provides that the U.N. “Security Council ... 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace or security”.  
This provision was accompanied by Art. 43 of the UN-Charter which stated that the 
member states should enter into agreements providing to the Security Council armed forces on a 
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permanent basis.393 However, no such agreement was entered into and the Security Council must 
seek troops commitments by member states in each specific operation.394  
A U.S. statute authorizes the President to negotiate such an agreement with the Security 
Council.395 Such an agreement then needs Congressional approval.396 Only those forces, which 
have been referred to in the Congressional act of approval, may be provided to the Security 
Council. 397 It is not likely that the Security Council will soon have its “own” military force. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to focus on the current legal situation, which raises important 
questions of U.S. constitutional law in the case that the U.S. is involved in a military operation, 
which is backed by Security Council resolution. 
 
2. The Relation of the USA with the U.N. in the Area of Security Policy 
a) The need for Congressional Authorization even if there is a Security Council Resolution 
Although the U.S. is a Permanent Member of the Security Council and has veto power398 
the President retains the constitutional power to deploy troops even when the requirements of the 
U.N.-Charter are not met and so violates international law.399 
One of the most interesting legal issues with repect to the role of the President, the U.S. 
Congress, and the U.N. Security Council focusses on the question of whether a U.N. Security 
Council resolution, authorizing the use of force, is a sufficient legal basis for the President of the 
                                                 
393  Jane E. Stromseth, Treaty Constraints: The United Nations Charter and War Powers, in THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, 83 
(Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994) (hereinafter Stromseth, Treaty Constraints). 
394  Id. at 84. 
395  Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 
615 (1993) (hereinafter Stromseth, Rethinking). 
396  Id. 
397  Id. 
398  U.N. charter, arts. 23 (1) and 27 (3) . 
399  HENKIN, supra note 4, 250-51. 
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United States to deploy troops and send them into combat, or if – even with there being a 
Security Council resolution – Congress still has to approve of the initiation of military action.400  
(1) The Police Power Approach 
After the North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea in June 1950, the Security 
Council of the United Nations issued a resolution which urged North Korea to withdraw its 
forces and further asked the Member States of the U.N. to assist in the execution of the goals of 
the resolution.401 U.S. President Harry Truman referred to that resolution when he justified his 
deployment of U.S. troops to support the South Koreans,402 by arguing the “police power model 
of presidential authority in the U.N. context”.403 He first employed the Commander-in-Chief 
clause to argue that the President has the broad power to secure the foreign interests of the U.S. 
including the functioning of the U.N. system.404 He then stated that the U.N. Charter as a treaty 
had to be “faithfully executed” by the President, and that the President could deploy U.S. troops 
without Congressional approval if there is a authorizing Security Council resolution.405 He then 
concluded that the use of force in the context of an U.N. operation is to be seen not as a “war” 
but as an “international police action”.406 
This position has been criticized. First, if the President can commit U.S. troops in large 
scale hostilities in the context of an U.N. operation, this power would undermine the 
Constitutional power of Congress to declare war.407 Second, a U.N. Security Council resolution 
only authorizes the use of force and does not require a U.N. Member State to engage in military 
                                                 
400  Stromseth, Treaty Constraints, supra note 393, at 84. 
401  U.N. Document S/1501 (1950); Stromseth, Treaty Constraints, supra note 393, at 86. 
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combat. There is no treaty obligation to provide troops if there is such a resolution.408 Third, a 
large military operation like that in Korea was no mere “police action”.409 
(2) Political Accomodation 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 the United Nations and the U.S. responded.410 
The U.N. Security Council agreed upon Resolution 678 which provided that the U.N. members 
may use “all necessary means” to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait.411 
As late as in December 1990, the Bush Administration held the view that it did not need 
Congressional approval before initiating combat in Kuwait and Iraq, and resolution 678 gave the 
President, as the Commander-in-Chief, the power to use the U.S. army.412 In January 1991, it 
became evident that Congress was concerned with its constitutional war powers. And due to 
political concerns, President Bush asked Congress to agree upon a resolution which would 
support the use of all means to execute the goals of Security Council Resolution 678.413 However, 
President Bush made it clear that he was determined to use the troops notwithstanding a possible 
negative decision by Congress.414 Congress agreed on a joint resolution that authorized the 
President to use force to enforce Security Council Resolution 678. 415  Although Congress 
authorized the use of force to free Kuwait, it did not subscribe to the notion of an unlimited 
Presidential power regarding U.N. “police actions”.416 Congress rejected the “police power” 
approach, which had been used during the Korea crisis; instead Congress stressed that it alone 
had the constitutional competence to decide whether U.S. troops should be involved into 
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hostilities.417  President Bush did not consider Congressional approval to be constitutionally 
required.  He made the statement “(i) didn’t have to get permission from some old goat in the 
United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.”418 
Professor Stromseth called the President’s request for approval “political accomodation 
model”, which requires the President to seek authorization by Congress if he wants to send a 
substantial number of U.S. troops into a combat operation, under the auspices of the U.N. 
Security Council.419 The so-called “political accomodation approach” complies with the idea of 
shared war powers, which can be found in the U.S. Constitution and does not delete the 
requirement of Congressional approval when a large number of U.S. soldiers have to be 
deployed and face risky operations.420 Under this model, smaller operations in the context of an 
U.N. Security Council resolution may be started with only the President deciding upon them.421 
This war powers model would therefore guarantee the required degree of flexibility.422 
b) Comment 
Treaties are inferior in rank to the U.S. Constitution. 423  A U.N. Security Council 
Resolution, which is based on the U.N. Charter, therefore cannot serve as a substitute for  
Congressional approval. Otherwise it would be possible for the President to avoid the constraints 
of the Constitution, which would negatively effect the system of checks and balances. 
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Chapter IV 
Assessment and Concluding Remarks 
It has to be emphasized that it is not possible to conduct a “real” comparative analysis 
between the legal structure of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the “War 
Powers” provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. is a sovereign state with clear 
responsiblities and structures with respect to the foreign affairs powers, whereas the European 
Union is not yet a sovereign entity, but can only be described as a “supranational federation”424 
of independent and sovereign states. The EU escapes the classical dichotomy of nation states and 
international organizations. It is something new, an entity which evolves out of slow progress 
towards a new form of government for the European nations.425 The EU has currently not a 
constitutional structure that would allow a classical comparative analysis with the U.S. 
Constitution. However, the EU is integrating more and more, even in the field of foreign and 
security policy. Although this policy field is considered to be “high” politics, dominated by the 
concept of sovereignty, there is progress within the EU to achieve more cooperation in this field. 
This is due to Europe recognizing that without cooperation it will not have a major role in 
current international affairs. 
In the EU, we see that unanimity is the dominant principle when it comes to questions 
having security and defense implications. It requires therefore consensus among the EU leaders 
to achieve progress in the security and defense area. This explains the slow movement towards 
an integrated common defense or a common defense policy. 
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However, as a response to the decade-long crisis in former Yugoslavia, the EU Member 
States have made considerable progress. They were able to include the so-called Petersberg 
Tasks in the Treaty on European Union and agreed upon the establishment of a Rapid Reaction 
Force to handle crisis situations. 
In the U.S., the main question is the balance of power between the President and 
Congress. Both are the dominant players in the area of foreign affairs and war powers in 
particular. Although there are plenty of constitutional lawyers who argue that Congress has a 
much larger role when it comes to the war powers, in reality the President is the most important 
player. Only when U.S. military involvement went wrong, Congress was able to claim a bigger 
role. An example is the disastrous war the U.S. fought in Viet Nam. In the aftermath of this 
devastating experience, Congress passed the controversial War Powers Resolution, which tried 
to limit the powers of the President. 
Today, however, it seems to be the case that the President has attained a much more 
important role again. It may be appropriate to say that the respective balance of power between 
Congress and the President depends on their current political power. 
The U.S. Supreme Court usually does not interfere with this particular struggle of power 
between the Chief Executive and the lawmaking body, leaving it to the political branches to find 
a way to balance their respective competences against each other. 
However, it has to be emphasized that, in the U.S., the Courts are disqualified from 
dealing with questions which have military or security related implications. In contrast with this 
approach, in the EU the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. With respect to the power of the purse, it can be noted that in the U.S., Congress 
has such power. Thereby, Congress has a very important tool for exerting influence. In the EU, 
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military operations are financed by those Member States which are conducting them. The 
European Parliament has no power comparable to that of Congress. 
Although it is not possible to conduct a real comparative analysis, this paper nevertheless 
may help the reader to understand why the U.S. on the one hand and the EU on the other hand 
act in a specific way. The depicted EU legal structures may explain why the EU was often not 
able to produce a swift, quick and unanimous response to a urgent crisis situation. After looking 
at the legal framework and the practical approach in the U.S., it is possible to conceive why the 
US can react decisively to a crisis situation. The concentration of power in the office of the 
President explains timely U.S. action and involvement. 
However, as the recent EU practice in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia confirms, the EU Member States are able to agree 
unanimously on military operations. These examples should not lead one to be too optimistic, 
because these operations were of a lower level politically. In these cases, there were no 
extremely important national interests at stake. 
As the latest Iraq conflict has proven, when there are massive national interests involved, 
it is not possible to achieve consensus among the EU Member States regarding a common 
approach to a severe political crisis. 426  Since Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg had a completely different view as to the Iraq crisis compared to the UK, Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark, the EU was not a significant player in the months before 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq.427 
In early 2004, the EU is in a crisis: The Draft Constitution was blocked by Poland and 
Spain, which have the idea that they should continue to have almost the same voting power as 
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Germany and France, which have a much larger population.428 The enlargement process will 
require enormous expenditures while the net payer states France, Germany, the UK, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Austria are not willing to contribute more to the EU budget.429 Finally the 
violation of the Stability and Growth Pact by Germany and France raises doubts as to the future 
stability of the Euro.430 
It remains to be seen whether the EU will be able to overcome the current obstacles and 
move further towards more integration in the area of foreign policy. Maybe, the notion of a 
multi-speed Europe can be relied upon to solve the current deadlock. This would mean that those 
Member States which are willing to integrate more towards a political union may go ahead and 
form new structures within the EU to implement more ambitious ideas that may not yet be 
acceptable by traditionally reluctant countries such as the UK, Denmark, and Sweden.431 
Moreover, there should be consensus that Europeans need to spend more on their defense 
in order to achieve a more just burden sharing between the U.S. and the EU states with respect to 
the task of providing security for Europe. 432  Therefore, improved cooperation among the 
Europeans in the area of defense is in the genuine interest of the US.433 With the US being the 
only military superpower in the world, it remains to be seen what kind of status the EU will 
achieve and especially how the legal framework in the EU will evolve.  
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